Foreign policy: a good time to start

15/04/2021

One small entertainment I allow myself in the few hours that I have spare each week is to build up my collection of model armoured vehicles, mostly to 1/72 scale.

I have been doing this for over ten years, amassing nearly 200 models, of which I have exactly 60 types of tank. My ambition, possibly somewhat forlorn, is to acquire a model of each type of tank which has seen service anywhere in the world, from when the British first fielded their Mark I tanks at the Battle of Flers-Courcelette (part of the Battle of the Somme) on 15 September 1916, to the present day.

That is probably not as ambitious as it sounds, as in the process of a little more than 100 years since the tank was invented, there have probably been not much more than 100 distinct types built, with the largest number of types appearing during the Second World War.

During that period, from 1939-1945, it may surprise some people to learn that the operator of largest number of distinct types was the British Army (although not all saw action). As last count, I put the number at 20 (including US types), which is quite a staggering array of firepower.

However, for most amateur historians in this field (and I would myself as one), we are imbued with the tales of Allied inferiority when compared with the Germans (although, arguably, the Soviets outclassed them in the later years of the war). The perceived inferiority of the Shermans and the Churchills against the German Panthers and Tigers during the Normandy campaign is a matter of historical record.

However, it was not always so and recently I have been focusing on early British tanks, of the 1939-41 period. And while it is fair to say that we built some serious lemons (the Cruiser Mk I and II and the Matilda Mk I, for instance), a shining exception is the Matilda Mk II (pictured).

What emerges from a study of this vehicle is quite how good it was for the period. Its frontal armour was impervious to all German anti-tank guns, short of the Flak 88, and its 2-pounder gun (40mm calibre) was capable of taking out any of the German (and Italian) tanks in the field.

The use of the Matilda II by the BEF in the one and only armoured counter-attack in Northern France, in the Battle of Arras on 21 May 1940, so spooked the German High Command that it is credited with causing Hitler to issue his famous "stop" order on the panzer advance, thereby permitting the evacuation at Dunkirk and possibly changing the course of the war.

The point of this lengthy introduction, apart from a modicum of self-indulgence, is to support an argument that, in the field of human conflict, forces will rarely prevail unless they have the necessary equipment to give them (at the very least) a tactical advantage – an argument that might go back to Agincourt, where English archers prevailed against a numerically superior French army.

And it is here, that history might guide us in evaluating the current situation as between the Russian forces massing on the Ukrainian border, and the Ukrainian forces themselves. By any measure, it has to be said that much of the Russian equipment being fielded is far superior to that which opposes them, giving the Russians a clear qualitative, if not quantitative advantage.

Equipment, of course, is only part of the story. The quality of the generalship and political will are vital parts of the equation. However, it might be said that the equipment (to an extent) reflects both these elements. Good generals, with political support, will ensure that troops have the right equipment – and vice versa as we saw in the UK's involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Although I would take care not to over-emphasise the role of equipment, though, I would nevertheless argue that it is a vital factor in evaluating both intentions and capabilities in any emerging hotspot – as is the case currently with the Ukraine.

But it also helps us evaluate the quality of any analysis, as to whether there is an intelligent appreciation of the type and scale of the equipment being deployed. I've alluded to this before, but now we have The Sun describing clearly identifiable 2S35 Koalitsiya-SVs as "tanks".

Given the role of artillery in the earlier clashes between Ukrainian and Russian-backed forces, the presence of this advanced equipment is very much a game-changer. Reports which mark the units as "tanks" or generic "military equipment", are written by children who have no understanding of the implications of what they are looking at.

But, when it comes to equipment and the intentions of the Russians, it is not only what we're seeing that matters – it is what we're not seeing that counts. If the Russians had in mind a major armoured push, perhaps aiming to cut the Ukraine in two, with counter-attacks from Crimea and Belgorod, one might have thought that they would hold off for a while until their lead formations had taken delivery of sufficient numbers of the next-generation T-14 Armata tanks and the matching MICV platforms – not due until next year.

Arguably, with the types of equipment in place – and the numbers of troops deployed - the Russians are gearing up for local interventions to block any Ukrainian incursions into Donbass, rather than contemplating vast, strategic sweeps, settling control of eastern Ukraine once and for all. In effect, the picture on the ground suggests no more than a holding operation.

With that in mind, it is perhaps easier to see past the superficial analysis which the UK media has on offer, with the Guardian writing of Russia’s "unexplained build-up along Ukraine's border".

The paper seems to consider only two options, "an attention-grabbing feint or a prelude to an escalation", suggesting that the outcome "will depend on the Kremlin's will". It then goes om to say that, through the build-up, "Russia has already signalled that if a larger war does take place, it is prepared to deliver a hammer blow to its neighbour".

But actually, while the presence of elite forces and high-grade equipment points to the Kremlin's serious intentions, the force mix and scale does tend to point to a reaction force, there to deter Ukrainian forces from attempting serious incursions across the Line of Contact.

This much is reflected in the patronising report from the BBC, which has the sense to cite Andrei Kortunov, head of the Russian International Affairs Council. His take is that the Russian moves are about "deterrence". He draws attention to Kiev's reinforcements in eastern Ukraine and argues that Russia's actions are to avert any move to retake areas controlled by Russian-backed militants.

When this fits in with the facts on the ground, then we really don't need to divine deeper motivations, such as an attempt to block Ukraine's membership of NATO (which is not really on the cards), or sending messages to Biden.

But there is another element which mitigates against large-scale military action by the Russians. Kortunov points to there being little sense that all-out war would be popular among Russians already coping with Covid, sanctions and the impact of a low oil price. He believes the "mobilising potential" of foreign policy adventures is now "almost depleted" with people more concerned with their own problems.

When one bears in mind the domestic response to the Afghan war, which eventually forced the Soviet withdrawal from the region – and played a part in the downfall of the USSR – even Putin will need to think twice about mounting a major, and protracted military adventure.

What could make the difference, though, is overt Western support for Kiev, which might engender overconfidence in the Ukrainian government, to the extent that it risks taking on the Russians. With that, most analysts concede that the situation could quickly spiral out of control.

It is thus vitally important that Western governments read the situation correctly, including the UK government. Yet, all we have for the moment is th3e G7 Foreign Ministers' statement, which aligns the British with the US and the EU position, calling on Russia "to cease its provocations and to immediately de-escalate tensions".

Ostensibly, this does not demonstrate any great appreciation of the situation and risks sending the wrong message to Kiev. If an independent "Global Britain" is to make a difference, now would be a good time to start.

Also published on Turbulent Times.