Here, there is the germ of an explanation for the inadequate response. We are in fact seeing a version of
déformation professionnelle, where the officials and "expert" advisers had so heavily invested in "The Plan" that their first instinct would be to defend it.
To do otherwise would amount to an admission of fallibility which does not come easy. The reputations of High Persons, in these instances, is often more important than mere lives, as graphically illustrated by Norman Dixon in his
ground breaking book, "On the Psychology of Military Incompetence".
In the event that the influenza plan had to be discarded (which it should have been), not least of the problems confronting officials would have been the need to admit that no one had thought actually to prepare a plan for a SARS epidemic, thus expecting ministers – as well as the Great Leader – to make up policy on the hoof.
As if that was not enough, however, the Reuters report also confirms that, in the early stages, the officials and experts systematically understated the dangers of the approaching epidemic, allowing a deluded (or misinformed) Johnson on 3 March to declare that: "Our country remains extremely well prepared", adding: "We already have a fantastic NHS, fantastic testing systems and fantastic surveillance of the spread of disease".
As it turns out, the nation might have been prepared for the flu but we were completely unprepared for a SARS epidemic. The testing system was nowhere up to the job and the surveillance system was designed to be wound up once the epidemic had been established.
Perhaps a more astute prime minister might have been more rigorous in cross-examining his officials, and been less gullible when assessing the claims of his experts. After all, this is not the first time the health establishment had got their projections completely wrong,
vide Salmonella and eggs, Listeria and BSE.
In a tragic inversion, though, where the standard response of the "experts" is to overstate the case, laying the foundations for the classic "scare", in this case the danger was understated and the nation was unprepared.
Perversely, the Reuters report states that, as countries debate how to combat the virus, some experts here say, the lesson from the British experience may be that governments and scientists worldwide must increase the transparency of their planning so that their thinking and assumptions are open to challenge.
But this must be special pleading. The reality is that the planning could not have been more transparent. The original influenza plan was openly published, it was opened up to consultation and every amendment, with supporting documentation, was published. What was not published, of course, was the SARS plan – but that was because there wasn't one.
For the moment, though, we are in the grip of a SARS epidemic which has produced 55,242 recorded cases so far and 6,159 acknowledged deaths – although both figures are understated. Come the inquiry, therefore, the focus must be on why so many people got it so wrong, so many times.
Before we get there, it would be no bad thing to reflect that, had people in high places - taking the big bucks and happily collecting their gongs and sundry other honours – done their jobs properly, we would not need the gushing odes to the wonders of the NHS, and a fallen prime minister.