EU Referendum


EU Referendum: a fog of incomprehension


10/02/2016




No doubt Jacek Rostowski was honest in his intentions when he wrote of the Brexit camp's arguments in the Guardian yesterday, telling us that leavers were "selling a Pollyanna vision that will never exist". The man is an economist and former finance minister of Poland and, as Pete North wrote, he can do us a lot of damage.

Rostowski argues that the leavers are hankering after "an agreement based on 'friendly' negotiation with EU member states" which "would permit the UK to opt out of the free movement of people, end EU budget contributions, extend regulatory opt-outs and allow access to Europe's single market".

Even though such a vision is illusory – and therefore entirely unachievable – the former finance minister is paying us the compliment of assuming that we are unified behind these ideas. The reality, though, is that there is no single vision. Contact any number of individuals or groups within the leaver "community" and you will get staggeringly different and often contradictory messages.

Further, in respect of certain prominent individuals, we will find a bewildering progression of opinions, to the extent that the same person can simultaneously advocate conflicting solutions or, over time, hold completely different views without ever explaining how or why their views have changed.

Thus, it would be a significant step if we had within the leavers any form of unanimity, even if it was agreement on completely wrong-headed ideas. At least that would demonstrate that the "community" was capable of agreeing on any single thing – something which, so far, it has proved incapable of doing.

In fact, the closest the "aristocracy" of this group have come to agreeing is on their detestation of Flexcit, the one plan that is actually workable. This is, therefore, ignored not only by the Jacek Rostowskis of this world, but also by the self-appointed custodians of the eurosceptic flame.

And the one thing that all these people have in common is that none of them have actually read Flexcit. Some have scanned a few pages so that they can say they have looked at it, and some have read (but not understood) the first few paragraphs of the two-page summary.

Some don't even realise there is a summary, and complain bitterly about the length, often grandly declaring that "ordinary voters" will never read something so long – projecting their own idiocy onto us, as if we were not aware that this document is for top-level campaigners and was never intended for general circulation.

That said, the long version is now running to nearly 44,000 downloads, and a short, pamphlet-length version is in the course of preparation, yet still it manages to remain invisible to the self-appointed guardians of the debate, including the media.

Had Rostowski done the unthinkable and read the heretical thoughts contained in Flexcit, he would have had trouble projecting the negotiations as an attempt by the leave campaign to secure "a new UK-EU free trade agreement", without opting into freedom of movement or paying into the budget. This is an option specifically excluded from Flexcit.

This is absent is precisely for the very reason Rostowski excludes it. "No country has full access to the single market without making a contribution to the EU budget and accepting the four freedoms", he says: "and no such exception would be made for Britain".

Rostowski goes on to say that campaigners assume that on Britain leaving, the EU's remaining 27 members would be intent on helping. This he regards as paradoxical, "given that the same people campaign to leave on the basis of these states' unwillingness to accede to British demands for reform".

The man has a point here, which is why we, immediately post-exit, we would have senior representatives of the British government to initiate a charm offensive, conducting a goodwill tour of all the EU member state capitals to reassure the members of our good intentions – and our determination to come to a swift, mutually acceptable exit agreement.

One can envisage that it might be a year or so from the referendum result to lodging an Article 50 notification with Brussels, during which period the opportunity will be take to discuss the exit agreement with a wide range of players.

As to the negotiations themselves, Rostowski argues that "member states would naturally be driven by their national interests". He thus suggests that "even countries with common interests with Britain, for example those with trade surpluses that are mirrored in Britain's trade deficits, may well negotiate them away for advantage at Britain's expense on other (to them) more important issues".

That, on the face of it, seems a sound observation but if, on the other hand, the UK keeps the options limited, and narrows down the negotiations to a continuance of the EEA Agreement, there would be little scope horse trading.

Interestingly, Rostowski then digs into a little detail about the conduct of the negotiations. And surprisingly for one who claims to have attended more than 60 meetings of finance ministers, he gets it wrong – telling us that Britain "would have to negotiate withdrawal with the European Commission, not with individual states".

The procedure, however, is set by Article 218(3) TFEU, which requires the Commission to make recommendations to the Council, which then nominates "the Union negotiator or the head of the Union's negotiating team".

This, in fact, is a different ball game to the sort of negotiations in which Mr Rostowski has been involved – and very much above his pay grade. What he says should be taken with a pinch of salt.

The European Council will decide on its negotiating position, the UK separately with decide on its, and the two sides will meet to discuss terms. No doubt the teams fielded by both sides will split into sub-groups to discuss the detail of the settlement.

Rostowski rightly warns us that the talks will be taking place at a very sensitive moment, when Europe is exposed to much political and geopolitical risk. He thus suggests that Brexit "will have a profoundly destabilising impact, stirring resentment among other EU members and making it even less likely that Britain would achieve a favourable deal".

That much, in principle, is probably true, but if the UK goes out of its way to be helpful and accommodating, then this could work in its favour. Expecting hard and prolonged talks, the Council may respond positively to a straightforward exit plan submitted by the UK, which minimises the administrative and political burdens.

Most probably, the accession negotiations used as a model for the talks, of which all parties have considerable experience. As long as the UK keeps its pitch tightly focused and within the Council's comfort zone, there is no reason why the talks should not proceed fairly smoothly.

Mr Rostowski, however, clearly does not want this to be the case, as he descends into naked propaganda on matters which lie outside his immediate experience.

He argues, for instance, that - alongside negotiating with the EU - the UK would have to simultaneously renegotiate bilateral access to the EU's 52 trade deals with third parties, from which Britain currently benefits.

It is hard, he suggests, to see how a market of 65 million could negotiate the terms achieved by that of 500 million, just as it is hard to see how the UK's civil service could advantageously complete all these negotiations in just two years, after 40 years of leaving the job to the commission. The EU is the UK's main route to global market access and it would simply close shut.

This, as we know, is scaremongering. Relying on the principle in international law of the presumption of continuity, with the application of only minor administrative procedures, these deals could continue in place until such time as we felt it advantageous to renegotiate them.

It is on a false note, therefore, that Mr Rostowski offers us his conclusion that the leave camp is selling a Pollyanna vision of Britain outside Europe that will never exist.

The reality is that he is actually addressing a composite version of a vision that doesn't exist, but which is not dissimilar to some versions offered by some factions.

On the other hand, there is also in place a comprehensive exit plan which addresses all the issues that he could think of, and many more, offering a sound, realistic vision that could make the exit settlement a relatively simple and secure process.

And, while we could expect the "remains" to fight shy of this, the very strange thing is that so many leavers are also determined to avoid having a structured exit plan. Of those who have even considered one, far too many are obsessed with the first stage of the exit, unable to deal with the concept of a multi-phasic extraction which allows us to manage our withdrawal over a sensible period, free from arbitrary schedules.

When, however, the leave campaign can finally get round to the idea of having a properly structured exit plan in place, then we will be able to break though the fog of incomprehension and no longer have to bother with the likes of Mr Rostowski.