EU Referendum


Strategy ten: that "British model"


16/11/2015



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In the wake of Mr Cameron's Chatham House speech in which he introduced us to the idea of the "British model", it would not surprise me if the appearance of an article by David Goodhart in the Sunday Times this weekend is not entirely coincidental.

Goodhart is a former director of the think tank Demos and currently head of the Integration Hub, and has a recent history of advising David Cameron on how to win the referendum and how to sort out immigration. Now, "spontaneously", he has come up with a "secret weapon" for the Prime Minister, the idea of "framing Britain's negotiation as creating a new role for itself as the leader, or shaper, of the 'outer ring' of EU states".

Yet, strangely, that was exactly what we were suggesting could happen when, in advance of the Chatham House speech, we observed that the only thing we didn't know at present was how Mr Cameron intended to brand associate membership. We ventured that "something imaginative" could be on the stocks, such as a "free trade group", over which Britain may claim to assume leadership.

Now we know it is to be the "British model", and no sooner has that been established, we see the emergence of a proposal that Mr Cameron should assume leadership of this "outer ring", from a known Europhile sympathiser. In the context of winning an EU referendum, writes Goodhart:
… how much better to be the main shaper of Europe's outer ring than to be its foot-dragger-in-chief. It gives dignity and historical resonance to a position that will seem to many people a middle way between fully in and fully out — appealing to the mild Euroscepticism that is the centre ground of British opinion.
And that is precisely the purpose of the "British model" – to carve out a "middle way" that will win Mr Cameron the referendum.

The essential thing to realise here is that this is not an adjunct to Mr Cameron's play, designed to finesse or lend support to his four-point "wish-list", as Vote Leave seems to think. It is his play, and the one which he will use to pave the way for a better relationship with the EU.

It is, for instance, by adopting associate membership that Mr Cameron will be able to "protect non-eurozone states" so near to his Chancellor's heart, as legislation and treaty provisions which apply to the eurozone will not apply to the outer ring. For the first time since the inception of the single currency, there will be a cordon sanitaire between euro and non-euro states.

Membership of the outer ring will also liberate the UK and any other associate member from the "ever closer union" imperative. Only core members will be obliged to sign up to the whole package. In a two-speed Europe, the second tier can set their own pace – or not at all.

This, in fact, will be Mr Cameron's "different vision for Europe", a means by which – as he told his in his Chatham House address – he will endeavour to achieve his "flexible union of free member states who share treaties and institutions, working together in a spirit of co-operation".

The "competitiveness" issues and tackling "abuses of the right to free movement" can also be dealt with as part of the package, pulling together all four elements of the "heads of discussion" that Mr Cameron set out.

Vote Leave, prop. Dominic Cummings, seems to think such matters are "trivial", and that Mr Cameron will spin his "trivial wish list" as significant so that it seems like he has solved real problems. But that is very far from the case – the outcome will be (and will be seen to be) a very significant development.

What one must appreciate is that the European Union, as a treaty organisation, has embraced as one of its most fundamental tenets the principle of unity of purpose. Every state – in theory, at least – signs up to the same treaties. There is no "à la carte Europe" – and only reluctantly have opt-outs been agreed.

For the Member States now to recognise that the Union can be split is, therefore, a major development. It frees the eurozone to forge ahead with its own treaties, without requiring the unanimous agreement of all members, while the "outer ring" can stand back from political integration and concentrate on what Mr Cameron will call the "original purpose" of the EU – the trade agreement.

In fact, this will not take much spin to "big" this up. It will certainly look to be a significant achievement if the Prime Minister is allowed to perpetuate the myth that the "British model" is his idea, brought about by his efforts, through tense negotiations with the "colleagues".

In fact, he is pushing at an open door. Not only was this proposed in the Bertelsmann/Spinelli Fundamental Law of October 2013, it is also a means of regularising the position of Norway, Iceland and Switzerland, paving the way for the abolition of the EEA, and bringing all the EFTA states back under the same roof.

This also neutralises the "Norway Option", which would bring the UK into EFTA and create a bipolar Europe, with a dangerously attractive alternative for other states. This would significantly weaken the influence of the EU s and create conditions where we could establish a Single Market free from the grip of Brussels.

Bizarrely, though, we find that Dan Hannan supports Goodhart's vision, clearly failing to understand that this is offered as a means of keeping the UK inside the European Union. But then, this is yet another thing Hannan has consistently got wrong.

It is Owen Paterson, also in the Sunday Times (free transcript), who has a better handle on things. He points out that the "outer tier" would not change our status as a subordinate to a supranational government. It would be, in effect, a rebranding of our current status, locking us into the Union as it currently exists, while the eurozone forges ahead, to a new level of integration.

However, this is most definitely what we do not want. As Lost Leonardo points out, what we really need is a "new relationship" based on intergovernmental co-operation that recognises the right of the British people to have the definitive and deciding say in how and by whom we consent to be governed.

Crucially, we also need a relationship which also enables us to play a positive and constructive role in shaping the processes of economic globalisation to suit our interests and those of other free trading nations around the world. 

Since that is something we will never achieve as the "outer ring" of a greater European Union, our strategic targets have become that much clearer..