20/09/2015
As my bedtime book, I've been re-reading Chester Wilmot's
Struggle for Europe. And I have reached the part where Montgomery delivers on 15 May 1944 his "Final Presentation of Plans" for the invasion of Normandy, in the presence of the King and the Prime Minister.
Picking up on my views
on strategy and the need to engage with the real enemy, what struck me was how much of Montgomery's strategic plan rested on his appreciation on the enemy's intentions. In this, Montgomery was facing Erwin Rommel, the latter a master of manoeuvre who, uncharacteristically had gone for a static defence on the basis that Allied air superiority would prevent reserves reinforcing any breach.
"Last February", Montgomery said, "Rommel took command from Holland to the Loire. It is now clear that his intention is to deny any penetration: OVERLORD is to be defeated on the beaches".
The relevance of this to our referendum campaign is, of course, quite obvious. The leader of the allied armies could have produced a textbook plan for an invasion where, as originally intended, a relatively light force would punch through the defences, opening the way for exploitation forces to race through into the hinterland.
Montgomery instead reinforced his landing forces and added armour to the first wave, thereby sacrificing the opportunity of early exploitation for greater certainty in establishing a lodgement.
So it is with the "leavers" who must first garner intelligence on their enemy's intentions before they commit to their own strategic plan.
Needless to say, that does not stop the process of planning. What it does suggest is that we must hypothesise â as indeed we are doing â and come up with a series of options, ready to execute the strategy most appropriate to the circumstances, as they materialise.
But there is another lesson that can be gleaned from this situation â on how to respond to opinion polls â an issue we have
recently explored. The purpose of such polls is two-fold. Most obviously, they are used to predict the eventual outcome of the contest, but their primary use for campaigners is to provide feedback on initiatives, and clues on where to target efforts.
But, if one is to consider their value in this current context, the comparison we might consider is between relying on a poll conducted on the eve of Agincourt to predict the outcome of the Normandy invasion.
At the moment, we are measuring a different battle to the one which will most probably be played out, at a different time to that expected, on entirely different grounds. A strategy devised for the one is unlikely to be of much value for the battle we have to fight.
Even now, though, there is little wider appreciation of this, as the
Sunday Telegraph prattles about
a snap referendum, on the basis of George Osborne wanting to get the contest "out of the way".
The report asserts that Downing Street "is concerned that securing a good deal for Britain in 2017 would be impossible, with major elections taking place in France and Germany during the year". But, on the other hand, "several Cabinet ministers are warning an early referendum in 2016 would be unacceptable".
Not mentioned in the main
Telegraph report is the scenario trailed on this blog (and elsewhere), to the effect that Mr Cameron must defer any agreement pending a new treaty, promising "jam tomorrow" as long as we vote to remain at the end of 2017.
This, however, is picked up by
Booker who notes that Juncker's plans for the Union will require a major new treaty, dividing the EU and leaving Britain as a mere second-class or "associate member".
Under the rules, no such treaty could come about before 2021, transforming the basis on which David Cameron promised his referendum on our "new relationship" in 2017. And it is that which makes any strategy for the current situation inappropriate, and renders polls of little value.
Not until we have Cameron name the day will the dire guessing game finish, and the media start focusing on the actual issues. By then, we must have our strategy ready â and the means to execute it.
