EU Referendum


EU Referendum: forty years on


06/06/2015




Yesterday was the fortieth anniversary of the 1975 referendum on our membership of the EEC (styled as the "Common Market"), the treaty organisation that was always intended to become the EU and eventually the supreme government of what Monnet and his sidekick Arthur Salter were calling the "United States of Europe", way back in 1929.

In the 1975 referendum, seventeen million people voted to stay in the EEC and eight million voted "no" - 67.2 percent of those who voted supporting the proposition.

Currently, Lord Lawson is predicting a similar result for the 2017 referendum – although not by quite the same margin. Mr Cameron will get only "trivial" changes but will present them as something significant, and the public will dutifully roll over and vote for the sham – later to regret it.

The point, though, is that if Mr Cameron's tactics are so transparent that even Lawson can work them out, than it should not be beyond the wit of the "no" campaign to work out an effective counter-strategy. However, bearing in mind that Mr Cameron will have seen us coming, we also have to pre-empt his counter moves – and neutralise them.

Looking at the situation from the perspective of what we know, several things stand out. Firstly, Mr Cameron is committed to what he describes as a "full-on" treaty change, which he has promised and re-affirmed several times.

Secondly, we know Mr Cameron can't get a "full-on" treaty change. There isn't time and the "colleagues" wouldn't let him have one, even if there was. All he can do is achieve minor and consequential treaty changes. Even Angela Merkel has conceded that this would be possible. It would have to invoke the "simplified procedure" of Article 48, although that can only address Part III TFEU.

Thus, from the very outset, Cameron has set himself up for a fall. He cannot deliver that which he has promised. Furthermore, he knows it, we know it, and he knows we know it. He must also know that, when he brings his "deal" back from Brussels, we are waiting to dissect it and tell everyone that it doesn't match his "promise". The man is not stupid, and this response has been well-flagged up.

It is fairly easy to conclude from that that, if Mr Cameron allows us free rein to shred the deal he brings back from Brussels, and affords us untrammelled opportunities to tell the public how empty the deal really is, his position is damaged, and the outcome he is working for will be at risk. To preserve his own play, he is going to need his own countermeasures. As I see it, the options open to him include these:
   
1. Distraction - we point to his failure ... he points to his successes. Thus, he muddies the water. The argument ceases to be: "he promised and didn't deliver". Instead, Mr Cameron changes the focus. He ignores what he promised and highlights what he got, claiming equivalence. The debate then gets bogged down in detail.

2. Confusion: he pads out the "deal" with a huge amount of detail. He presents the "treaty", and then adds protocols. To this he adds intergovernmental agreements (the Danish ploy) and then adds political declarations (from the European Council). These are topped up with Commission commitments. All of this goes into a White Paper, which is now well over 100 pages long.

3. Theatre: Mr Cameron presents a show: the UK has the presidency in the second half of 2017. He can stage-manage an informal Council meeting in late August/early September, putting the deal to the colleagues. He then ramps up the tension, building to fever-pitch with a three-shirt "summit" in Brussels in early October. With the media frenzy at its height, he comes out into the pale dawn of the Brussels morning, tired but triumphant - he has done a deal for Britain and Europe ... his "Heston moment". He is presented as the hero of the hour.

4.Timing: all this has happened at the eleventh hour. In triumph, he reports to Parliament, then the White Paper is rushed out ... there is a debate and both Houses vote in favour ... the media applauds. A summary is sent out to all households, after the "yes-no" leaflets have gone out. The government gets the last word. Days later, the postal votes go in.
When the votes are counted and analysed, we find that the "successful deal" effect buys Cameron 20 points. We lose the referendum by a substantial margin.

On the other hand, we highlight the playbook, expose the tactics and thereby get the public to discount them - prior to the event. We have to paint the negotiations as a deliberate and cynical charade, calculated to manipulate the vote and conceal the fact that there never was any intention to bring back a serious deal.

But, even if we succeed in this, that is only one element of the campaign. We still have the basic hurdles to surmount. Here, the "three-legged stool" comes into play. We have to present the EU as a problem, offer the solution and paint a glowing picture of the outcome. If we don't get this right, we also lose.

Nevertheless, I think we can win, but it will need a heroic effort and a good grasp of strategy - theirs as well as ours. If we lose, we only have ourselves to blame.