05/06/2015
"I don't foam at the mouth", writes Tim Montgomerie in his column in
The Times. "My eyes do not swivel. I don't howl at full moons. But there is nothing that David Cameron could bring home from his bratwurst, paella and trout tour of European capitals that would convince me to vote 'yes' in the forthcoming referendum".
With uncommon clarity, Montgomerie thus articulates the only coherent position to take in the forthcoming referendum unless, of course, you are in favour of continued EU membership. There is no credible middle way.
Yet, not a million miles away from Montgomerie physically, yet communicating from another galaxy, we have Matthew Elliott writing in the
Telegraph. He says that the Prime Minister should "push on with delivering a far-reaching renegotiation", This should include "proper, full-on Treaty change" and a "fundamental change" in Britain's relationship with the EU. "He has the plan", says Elliott, "He has the opportunity. Now he deserves our help delivering it".
Yet it is Elliott, not Montgomerie, who as noted by
Breitbart, is the man touted as the leader of the "no" campaign. This is also the very same man who told the
Evening Standard that: "If the Government gets a two-tier Europe, we're very much in". In that case, we were told, diehard eurosceptics may well have to fight a "no" campaign without his outfit.
Unsurprisingly, therefore, while the "yes" campaign has hit the ground running, the
Spectator is reporting that the putative "no" campaign is having trouble getting started. We are told that many of the potential participants, from politicians to donors (but including Elliott), are keeping their powder dry until they see the result of the renegotiation.
This is the "
wait and see" strategy, which Matthew Parris wanted us to follow. Its popularity, Forsyth believes, is a result of intervention by No. 10, which has been "discreetly urging Tories not to undermine the Prime Minister while he is on diplomatic manoeuvres by declaring that they want out". But, if they wait until the negotiations are concluded, Forsyth says, "They will find themselves with much ground to make up".
That No. 10 should be trying to influence the management of the "no" campaign might sound rather disturbing, but this is not the first time we have seen such reports. On 8 February this year, the
Sunday Times reported that Daniel Korski, Cameron's Downing Street point man on Europe, was "in regular contact with senior figures in European pressure groups who would lead the 'In' and 'Out' referendum campaigns â as often as two or three times a day".
That the "out" (or "no" campaign as it has become) representative in this instance was Matthew Elliott has not been denied, yet he is also the man who is actively promoting a strategy that would guarantee the failure of the "no" campaign.
The problem is that any departure from the Montgomerie line concedes the high ground to the "yes" campaign. The only way the "no" campaign can maintain an intellectual purity that is vital to its own credibility is to hold that membership of the EU is wrong in principle. There can be no circumstances where the UK can stay in the EU. Once the point of principle is abandoned, the referendum becomes a squabble over detail â a messy argument about whether the "reform" has been sufficient.
But the danger is that those like Elliott who want to play the "reform" game are not only conceding the strategic issue, they are also â at the very least - tactically inept.
In particular, they are under-estimating the degree to which Mr Cameron is able to control the timing, and his mastery of presentation. The Prime Minister will be stretching out his "renegotiations" until the last minute â even to days before the postal votes go in. He will then stage-manage bringing back his treaty from Brussels â his "Heston moment" - and saturate the "no" campaign in a huge amount of detail, which must be analysed and to which they must respond.
We must also take account the possibility that, even if Elliott himself does not change sides, the media may well do â in fact, that is more likely than not. And, with the entire weight of the Government and three major political parties supporting the deal, that will leave leaves the "no" campaign with days rather than weeks to ramp up their campaign.
At that stage, we won't be fighting on a point of principle, but on the details. The "no" campaign will be pointing out what Mr Cameron has promised at various times, accusing him of failing to deliver. On the other hand, the Government, supported by the media, will be pointing to the successes â the propaganda directed not at the hardened eurosceptics (who will be committed to voting "no", come what may) but to the soft middle.
Crucially, even if that "middle" is not fully convinced by Mr Cameron's brilliant deal, the "no" campaign still has the problem of reassuring voters that leaving the EU is a safe bet, and a pressing need. But, having sat on its hands for two years while the "yes" campaign has saturated the terrain with FUD, there will be, as Forsyth observes, "much ground to make up".
And here one is assuming that Elliott is genuinely committed to leaving the EU. But, since the inception of
Business for Britain, his personal campaigning platform, Elliott has
been consistent in telling anyone who would listen that he does not want to leave the EU.
We noted this in
April 2013 when he was saying that B4B, "is absolutely not about leaving the EU". Then as now, he was arguing for the Government to, "seek a new deal for the EU and the UK's terms of membership".
"Instead of pushing the debate to the extreme corners of 'In vs Out'", he says, "we should be having a sensible discussion about what is right and what is wrong in our current arrangements". In Elliott's view: "Resisting renegotiation and denying people a say will push public sentiment further towards 'Out' and fast-track an EU exit".
In a line that is virtually indistinguishable from the Europhile
Open Europe - now advising Mr Cameron on the renegotiation strategy - Elliott says: "We believe strongly that a negotiated large change in our relationship with the EU is highly achievable".
"To get that large change", he adds, "we need to bring to the negotiation clarity of purpose, and a strong, united will. And we will only get that change if we are prepared to vote to leave the EU if our objectives in the negotiation are not met. But if we get the change we need, we won't need to leave".
Thus, Elliott is not in any way committed to leaving the EU, but simply sees the threat of leaving as a mechanism for getting a better deal for Mr Cameron.
But what people like Elliot don't realise â and he always has had a very slender grasp of the issues â is that the political terrain has undergone a huge change since Mr Cameron gave his "
Bloomberg speech" in January 2013, promising a referendum. His playbook is no longer valid â if it ever was.
The point at issue is that, at the time Elliott emerged with his B4B, Mr Cameron was assuming â and it was a reasonable assumption to make â that there would be treaty negotiation initiated by the "colleagues", onto which he could piggy-back his own demands. To that effect, it is germane to revisit the text of the speech, where he said:
At some stage in the next few years the EU will need to agree on Treaty change to make the changes needed for the long term future of the Euro and to entrench the diverse, competitive, democratically accountable Europe that we seek. I believe the best way to do this will be in a new Treaty so I add my voice to those who are already calling for this. My strong preference is to enact these changes for the entire EU, not just for Britain.
That, as we now know, is not to be but, even at the time, we were arguing that his timescale for a full-scale treaty negotiation by the end of 2017 was unrealistic.
However, in his Bloomberg speech, Mr Cameron has added the rider that, if there was no appetite for a new Treaty for us all, "then of course Britain should be ready to address the changes we need in a negotiation with our European partners". When his government had negotiated that new settlement, he said: "We will give the British people a referendum with a very simple in or out choice. To stay in the EU on these new terms; or come out altogether".
Currently, the Elliott view â supported incidentally by the bulk of the "eurosceptic" Conservative MPs - is that we should "wait and see" what Mr Cameron delivers, before we decide whether to reject the "new terms" and vote "no". But, without the full-blown treaty first envisaged, even the slender possibility of claiming a fundamental reform had evaporated.
This, then, puts Mr Cameron in the position of seeking a renegotiation which is doomed to failure before it even starts, yet Elliott and his Conservative supporters want us to sit on our hands until Mr Cameron comes home with a deal that he can't possibly get â arguing against a Prime Minister who says otherwise.
In promoting this bizarre strategy, though, Elliott has the backing of the likes of Daniel Hannan and Stuart Wheeler, as well as supposed "outers" like Ruth Lea and many more of the eurosceptic "aristocracy". They are the ones who have consistently promoted him as the leader of the "no" campaign.
On the basis of this promise, Elliott has occupied prestigious offices in the heart of Westminster, with a staff in double figures, playing out the role of "eurosceptic". Yet, weeks since the election, in terms of infrastructure, regional organisation, meetings, planning groups, literature, logos and all the paraphernalia of a campaign, we are seeing nothing coming out of London.
There is talk, however, of an "umbrella group" being formed, centred in SW1. But if this so much as includes Elliott's group â much less is led by it â then it is entertaining an enemy in the camp. Its "middle way" strategy will drag the "no" campaign down, dooming it to failure.
