EU Referendum


Booker: Iraqi regime change changed more than we realise


24/08/2014



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For all the coverage given to the gruesome beheading of James Foley, writes Booker, what rather got underplayed last week was the dramatic change in fortunes, at least in Iraq, of what was being excitably hailed as "the richest, most powerful, best-equipped terrorist group in the world".

The crucial reason why the murderous thugs from ISIS had seemed to be carrying all before them was the wholesale melting away of support for Iraq's increasingly corrupt and divisive ruler, Nouri al-Maliki, from all those who had previously backed him.

Not only did he lose the trust of Washington and his longtime Shia backers in Tehran; but also, very significantly, of the Sunni tribes all across northern Iraq, along with key parts of the largely Sunni-led Iraqi army. It was this that left that power vacuum that in June allowed the black-flagged rabble to take over Iraq's second-largest city, Mosul, and seemingly to threaten Baghdad itself.

But last weekend, just as fear of ISIS was being stoked up to its height, Maliki was finally toppled from power. With the arrival of his successor, Haider al-Abadi, all the negatives suddenly began switching to positives. Iran and the US rowed in behind him. The Sunni tribes that, in their distrust of Maliki, initially supported their ISIS fellow-Sunnis, now recognised, in the words of one of their leaders, that they are "enemies to all humanity".

The Iraqi army, far from being a busted flush, has, with US air support, already scored a string of victories: most prominently, along with the Kurds, the retaking of the huge Mosul dam. At least in Iraq, the chances of the would-be "Caliphate" remaining a credible fighting force now look very much slimmer than even two weeks back seemed possible.

So much for Booker's take, but in a graphic example of what has been called "wristband foreign policy", we see the West buying into the "caliphate", to the extent that military intervention in Syria is now being considered once again.

Nevertheless, it must have seriously hurt the Washington Post to ask: "Was Putin right about Syria?", but that is exactly what it is doing, this demonstrating a policy discontinuity of exception proportions.

But if the newspaper is acknowledging a possible error in the West seeking to take military action against the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, it is also acknowledging that the decision-making process was flawed. And without corrective action having been taken, there is nothing to say that the sentiment behind any turnaround is not equally flawed.

In other words, even if seeking to attack Assad was the wrong decision, supporting him, directly or indirectly, by attacking ISIS on Syrian territory is not necessarily the right decision.

Quite what a mess has been made of British policy, though, is indicated by the FCO annual report which recorded our policy on Syria as accelerating "political transition" and preparing for the aftermath.

More specifically, HMG wanted progress on a political transition which reduced levels of violence and improved humanitarian access. Ironically, it also wanted: "No major regional spill-over of the conflict and a reduced terrorist threat to the UK".

By its own measure, British policy has failed spectacularly on every count, and now if it is to abandon its ambitions for "political transition", its rout will be complete. Fortunately, though, the changes in Iraq are more lasting than the UK has given credit – not that it contributed much to them, having been thrown out in 2009.

Activity in Iraq against ISIS thus continues, but there is another observable change. Amongst others, Deutsche Welle reports a new wave of terrorist bombings, which this source says "threatens political stability".

Another interpretation is that the campaign is going asymmetric, which is not the response of a powerful, all-conquering force. This is a sign of weakness, and a pattern which the Iraqis have endured before without breaking.

Nevertheless, if the UK and the US continue to buy into the unified "caliphate" myth, though, then they force themselves to widen the campaign to Syria, where their impotence will be visible for all to see.

On the other hand, Iraqi forces may yet prevail in time to expose yet again the flaws in the Western analyses and policy-making processes. Breaking ISIS on Iraqi territory will wreck Assad's ploy, destroy the myth of the all-conquering "caliphate" and force him to deal with this enemy on his own turf, without intervention from the West.

If such an endeavour is to succeed, the Russian help will be essential, in terms of arms supplies and technical assistance, and even a few military advisers.

Therein lies possibly another change in the offing. If Russia is Syria's best hope, it also becomes the potential salvation of the West, in which case European and US policy towards Ukraine is going to have to change, becoming less confrontational. Perhaps it already is changing, given Merkel's emollient attitude on her visit to Kiev yesterday.

That regime change to which Booker referred thus has the potential to trigger changes far beyond those imaginable and which, even a few weeks ago, would have been considered impossible.  What in fact has turned out to be impossible, however, is the FCO's settled policy.  

Even now these changes which are going to have to be put in place are hard to imagine, but unless the US is truly mad enough to go down the route set out by Benjamin J. Rhodes, embracing attacks on Syrian territory without reference to Assad, an accommodation with Russia is going to be the key to a Middle East settlement.

And that really would be a change.

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