10/06/2012
It is now just over a month before our ground-breaking meeting in the Old Swan Hotel in Harrogate. But who would have thought, as the time the meeting was first proposed, that leaving the European Union would have been catapulted so far up the political agenda?
Understandably, we are also seeing calls for an in/out EU referendum strengthening, and as
our earlier piece suggested, we may see the Tories plant a referendum on their own agenda. There is some talk of an announcement at the party political conference in the autumn.
At the moment, though, the only thing on offer, and that from the preposterous Osborne, is the promise that the "referendum lock" will be triggered if a future treaty transfers "areas of power". But since any new treaty should apply only to the eurozone â and the "colleagues" intend to make it so â this alone will not break out the ballot boxes.
However, such is the pressure for a referendum that the Tories might feel impelled to do something more, especially if it is considered that a forthcoming "second class" status is a turning point.
The most likely response to this is a referendum to secure a mandate to negotiate a new "relationship", which could be more promising than even the Tories believe. Outside the framework of an IGC, the only way a single member state can insist on such a negotiation is if it first notifies its withdrawal from the EU, invoking Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty.
This Article states that it is up to the member state to notify the European Council of its intention to leave, and the Union is then required to negotiate and conclude an agreement with that state. It is also required to set out "the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union".
If continuing membership of the Single Market remains an article of faith, Britain could then negotiate to remain in the EEA (of which we are already part by virtue of our EU membership). This would keep the "four freedoms" and the Single Market intact, but ditch any other provisions.
Although this is less than full withdrawal, the differences would be marginal. As long as we are signatories to UNECE, the OIE,
Codex Alimentarius, and a host of other trans-national organisations â not least the Bank for International Settlements, with its Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel) â then we are bound by a myriad of provisions that would otherwise come within the purview of the EEA.
The crucial thing here, is that, withdrawal from one particularly restrictive and intrusive regional body does not mean departure from the international community. We could even belong to such organisations as the European Space Agency and Eurocontrol without having to be a member of the EU. Things like defence co-operation can still be managed via Nato.
However, what could turn out to be a bigger problem for a departing UK in negotiating its "future relationship with the Union" is the difficulty in knowing with whom, or what, it is negotiating â and getting the other members to focus.
We will know better at the end of June but, as it stands, the "colleagues" are intent on a "two-speed" Europe. The likelihood is, therefore, that we would be negotiating with an EU comprised potentially of two very different halves, the inner and outer circles.
Nor indeed could we predict the membership of these "circles". The idea that the inner circle would comprise seventeen members cannot be taken for granted. We may expect Greece to leave. Others may follow. On the other hand, others (Latvia, for instance) may join.
There is also another tenable scenario â the failure of any new treaty which aims for the fiscal and final political union of eurozone states. It is all very well Cameron expressing his approval of the idea (and even his encouragement), but the peoples of the states concerned have yet to be consulted.
Without doubt, some of these would have to be consulted formally by way of referendums â specifically Holland, France and Ireland. Germany has to confront the need for changes to the Basic Law, requiring a two-thirds majority in parliament and the probability of a challenge in the constitutional courts.
Given the extraordinary degree of integration involved, two possible scenarios could arise. Firstly, the treaty could be rejected out of hand, at any stage of the process from negotiation to final ratification. Almost as disruptive, the process could become so prolonged â in the manner of the constitutional treaty â as to become meaningless.
Then, in and amongst all this is the idea that the "colleagues" should then devote their undivided attention to resolving the British problem to the satisfaction of the British government. Is this likely to happen?
Standing back from that question, it is not unreasonable to expect the "colleagues" to be a tad preoccupied. They could not stop us making an application to withdraw, but there is nothing to say that they have to race to completion. Article 50 makes provision to extend the two-year period allocated for negotiations.
A British government, and especially a Tory government trying to convince a cynical electorate that it is acting in good faith, could find this something of a nightmare. With the best will in the world, it will be difficult to speed matters up, and there will be plenty of pressure for it to stay its hand until the eurozone situation has clarified.
In short, the government is confronted with the very thing no government ever likes â uncertainty. And, while the idea of a referendum might look extremely attractive, for the moment we might have to wait our turn before the "colleagues" can attend to our exit plan.
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